Legislature(1999 - 2000)
03/24/1999 01:06 PM House JUD
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* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HB 82 - IMMUNITY: CLAIMS ARISING FROM Y2K PROBLEMS CHAIRMAN KOTT announced the next order of business is HB 82, "An Act relating to immunity for certain claims arising out of or in connection with the year 2000 date change; and providing for an effective date." CHAIRMAN KOTT indicated that CSHB 82(L&C) is before the committee (1-LS0398\I). Number 2265 JANET SEITZ, Legislative Assistant to Representative Norm Rokeberg, Alaska State Legislature, stated HB 82 provides immunity for Alaskan businesses for certain claims arising out of connection with the year 2000 (Y2K) date change. A lot of money will be spent, not only on addressing the problem, but on lawsuits and Alaskan businesses are no exception to this exposure. House Bill 82 says that as-long-as a business goes through certain steps it will maintain an action. This immunity will assist in encouraging small businesses to continue or begin to address the Y2K situation. Number 2310 CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Representative Rokeberg what is a "smart building." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied it is a building that is wired and computerized. The fire systems and alarms are integrated into a black box type of computer system. Number 2386 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG noted that in the bill packet is a copy of S.96 and letters of support from a few organizations. He also has a series of amendments. TAPE 99-18, SIDE B Number 0001 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG continued. He explained the bill. It sets up the methodology of asserting a defense by indicating that a business is not liable for damages arising from the millennium bug. Section 1(a)(1)(A) - (F) delineates a list of steps to prepare a plan of due diligence. The way it is drafted indicates that a business would have to do every one of the steps. It is his contention that it should be amendment to show an example rather than a requirement. Section 1(a)(2) provides a more generic defense. Therefore, there are two different patterns of reasonableness of what a business has to do. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated that Section 1(b)(1) indicates a business that develops or manufactures software and hardware cannot assert a defense. A retailer in a chain would not be held to the same standards, however, that a hardware or software developer would be. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated that Section 1 (b)(2) indicates that a defense may not be asserted based on a contract. He has an amendment that removes the word "contract" and inserts the words "express warranty". If somebody has warranted by contract to fix a Y2K problem and they don't, they can't assert this defense. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated that Section 1(c) indicates that a class action suit can only be for damages of economic loss in excess of $50,000. He suggested that the committee members discuss the figure; it was a recommendation by the Alaska State Chamber of Commerce. It may be appropriate to raise it to $100,000, for example. The federal bill has a million dollar threshold. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated that Section 1(d) indicates that if there is a civil action the damages would be limited to economic losses only, unless fraud was committed. In the event of fraud, it would revert to the rules of standard common law and the rules of the court. Section 1(d)(2) provides that before an action can begin there has to be a curative state. In other words, there has to be a cure provision, mediation then remediation before full-blown litigation. Section 1(e)(3) defines the phrase "year 2000 date change". He has an amendment to change that. Number 0260 REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked Representative Rokeberg to address the changes to Section 1(a)(1)(A) - (F) that he briefly mentioned. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied he has an amendment to create a substantial efforts standard rather than to require the actual implementation of each element in the bill [(A) - (F)]. The elements then become examples of efforts. CHAIRMAN KOTT said that is nothing more than an either-or situation. The "or" seems to be inclusive of "either" because Section 1(a)(2) talks about due diligence. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated there is a choice here because of the language "or". It could be left alone. He has an amendment to change the second standard as well. Number 0344 REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said the issue of a list was discussed in the House Labor and Commerce Standing Committee. The conventional wisdom of the committee at the time was to try and include some structure while still making it clear that there might be other criteria to look to given a standard within an industry. The language isn't perfect in the committee substitute, but the amendment gets it closer. Number 0445 CHAIRMAN KOTT closed the meeting to public testimony. Number 0568 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG moved Amendment 1. It reads as follows: Page 3: Delete lines 24-27 Insert: (3) "year 2000 date change" includes processing date or time data from, into and between calendar year 1999 and calendar year 2000, and leap year calculations; in this paragraph, "processing" includes calculating, comparing, sequencing, displaying and storing." CHAIRMAN KOTT objected for discussion purposes. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated Amendment 1 changes the definition of the phrase "year 2000 date change" to start on or about July 1, 1999 and to extend through the entire year 2000 when these problems are expected to crop up. Since there is controversy about when the next century will start - 2000 or 2001 - it is appropriate to adopt the amendment for clarification. CHAIRMAN KOTT removed his objection. There being no further objection, it was so moved. Number 0627 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG moved Amendment 2 (1-LS0398\I.3, Ford, 3/22/99). It reads as follows: Page 2, line 27: Delete "a contract" Insert "an express warranty" REPRESENTATIVE CROFT objected. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated Amendment 2 is quite an important element in the entire bill. According to correspondence with attorneys, if an action can't be asserted based on a contract then it would obviate the entire need for the bill. If there is a contractual obligation to fix a Y2K bug that is not delivered, there should be a proper course of action to take. Number 0712 REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked whether there can be interference with the right to contract. Number 0756 MIKE FORD, Attorney, Legislative Legal Counsel, Legislative Legal and Research Services, Legislative Affairs Agency, stated he doesn't feel that there is a constitutional problem including this provision. As it is written now, it won't allow someone to use this defense if there is a warranty built in. That doesn't necessarily rewrite the contract. It simply provides that in those situations this defense is not available. It reinforces the contract itself. The federal bill is broader. It says that the contract provision has to be relied on. Number 0802 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the selection of the word "express warranty" was his idea after consulting with Mr. Ford. Number 0815 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated it should say, "if a contract has already been negotiated that deals with this, then it should be left to them to handle it." The word "contract" may be too broad, but the word "express warranty" may be too narrow. He wondered what the federal law says. MR. FORD referred the committee members to SECTION 4, "APPLICATION OF ACT", in the federal bill. It reads as follows: (a) GENERAL RULE.-This Act applies to any Y2K action brought in a State or Federal court after February 22, 1999. (b) NO NEW CAUSE OF ACTION CREATED.-Nothing in this Act creates a new cause of action under Federal or State law. (c) ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR WRONGFUL DEATH EXCLUDED.-This Act does not apply to a claim for personal injury or for wrongful death. (d) WRITTEN CONTRACT CONTROLS.-The provisions of this Act do not supersede a valid, enforceable written contract between a plaintiff and a defendant in a Y2K action. (e) PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW.-This Act supersedes State law to the extent that it establishes a rule of law applicable to a Y2K action that is inconsistent with State law. Number 0916 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said it comes closer. He asked Representative Rokeberg whether he would object to using the phrase, "The provisions of this Act do not supersede a valid, enforceable written contract between a plaintiff and a defendant in a Y2K action." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied he is concerned because is says "in a Y2K action." Are we talking about a contract to deliver a commodity and then asserting a Y2K defense for the failure to deliver, or are we talking about something that relates to a Y2K contractual fix? He doesn't like the language. Number 0979 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said: "I mean. We're only talking about in (a) a specific Y2K thing so, part (b) says, 'The defense in (a) may not be asserted', and if you said in (2) to supersede the provisions of a valid, enforceable written contract, it sounds broad, but it's only applying to (a). The thing in (a) is pretty well-defined already. So, you just say (a)--(a) doesn't apply and (a) only applies in these certain Y2K areas anyway. It wouldn't apply to supersede a valid, enforceable written...I don't know why particularly written either, but it wouldn't supersede a valid, enforceable contract." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to SECTION 201, "CONTRACTS ENFORCED", of the federal bill. It reads as follows: In any Y2K action, any written term or condition of a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, including limitations or exclusions of liability and disclaimer of warranty, is fully enforceable, unless the court determines that the contract as a whole is unenforceable. If the contract is silent with respect to any matter, the interpretation of the contract with respect to that matter shall be determined by applicable law in force at the time the contract was executed. Number 1065 MR. FORD said he has not had time to analyze this version of the federal bill, but there are several provisions that seem to overlap. This section is sort of the same thing as the application section. It could be the federal style. Number 1118 REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked whether the state would be preempted if the federal bill remains broad. Section 4(e) of the federal bills says it supersedes state law. MR. FORD replied the federal law would control because of that provision. It, of course, depends on the final version of the federal bill. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said there are certain elements that are not preempted that allow for statewide control, such as certain thresholds for class action. They don't completely overlap. The committee members need to discuss whether they want express warranty to relate to a Y2K type of phenomenon, or whether they want it to relate to a universal contract. That's the issue. The federal law says in Y2K actions. Does that have to do with hardware, software, etc., or does that have to do with the chain of transactions based on a contract? In other words, a commodity that is transferred from a vender to a vendee, such as a widget. Number 1252 REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said the federal bill defines Y2K action as, "To provide civil action commencing in federal or state court in which the plaintiff's alleged harm or injury resulted directly or indirectly from an actual or potential Y2K failure or a claim or defense of a defendant is related directly or indirectly to a natural or potential Y2K failure." Number 1276 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the federal bill also allows for a defense of reasonable efforts - SECTION 202, "DEFENSES". That is slightly different than this bill. Number 1291 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said HB 82 with Amendment 1 defines the state's terms carefully. He suggested modifying the language to say, "The defense in (a) of this section may not be asserted to contradict the provisions of a valid, enforceable contract" [page 2, line 19]. It sounds broad, but it is tied to the defense in Section 1 (a). REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said Representative Croft's suggestion has to do with the widget scenario and not the vender-to-vendee scenario. Does it specifically have to do with hardware/software or a typical contractual relationship? By saying it is a general contractual relationship, it is an enforceable contract. The language in this bill prohibits the use of a defense, while the federal bill allows the use of a defense. Number 1414 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said the defense only applies to a Y2K date change concerning the failure of an electronic computer device. It can't be used to contradict a contract that says it will fix a Y2K problem. It only applies to Section 1(a) which is narrowly defined. Number 1458 REPRESENTATIVE GREEN asked whether extending an effort to a list of litanies would create a potential problem that could be solved much easier with a simple statement like Representative Croft suggested. A list would inevitably leave something out. Every year the lists in statute get amended. "It seems to me that the less we depend on lists and the more we depend on intent, the better off we're gonna be." Number 1510 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the point is being missed. The defense in Section 1(a) can't be used in terms of a contractual action, if Section 1(b)(2) is not modified. The issue is between a Y2K hardware/software thing versus a widget. There is a distinction. Number 1568 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said the distinction is between saying contract in general and a valid, enforceable contract in a Y2K action. There would be a big loophole if it said, "based on contract none of this applied, and it can't be used to modify the terms of a contract." He agrees it needs to be amendment, but he's not sure of the "express warranty" language. He suggested language that says, "somewhere along the lines that it can't be used to contradict what the parties have agreed to." "You can still get it for an action based on contract, as long as it doesn't modify what they agreed to." Number 1625 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he agrees with that, but he is concerned about it becoming too ambiguous. He suggested relying on Mr. Ford to come up with language. Number 1633 REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said everything that Representative Rokeberg has said regarding contracts can be turned around and applied to express warranties. "I think what you want is to say that if they got the exact, written contract on this topic, you know, and they've thought about it ahead of time how they're gonna work it out, then you don't want to interfere with that contract. They've already thought about it." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he is talking about the terms of a contract that deals with Y2K. REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said a contract would be dealt with expressly, but it's not just an express warranty. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said a defense should be able to be used for a widget, but not if there is an agreement to fix it for a Y2K problem. That's the distinction. He suggest the language, "an express Y2K warranty". This is the crux of the whole bill. Number 1730 MR. FORD said it would be helpful to pull Section 1(b)(2) out of the provision and to put a separate subsection that embodies similar language to the federal bill. It would be clearer and there wouldn't be a hang up on whether it's a defense, claim or counterclaim. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked Mr. Ford whether he means warranties of Y2K activities or widgets. MR. FORD replied he's talking about the provisions in a Y2K action. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked Mr. Ford whether a Y2K action is a fact-pattern for the defense or is it something that is talked about in a contract. MR. FORD replied, if it isn't contained in a contract, it wouldn't be an action based on a contract. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said that's like putting in an action based on express Y2K warranty. MR. FORD said it's all fruit, just different kinds. "We started out with a provision that says, if it's a contract--if it's based on a contract, you don't get this defense. If your claim is based on some provision in the contract, you don't get this defense. You have to rely on your contract. The amendment we have before you, actually narrows that a bit to express warranty. Express warranty is something in a contract. Now, what the federal government has done here is simply say, well, we're not going to talk about express warranty, we're going to talk about any provision of the contract that is rendered unenforceable. If it's a valid, enforceable contract, that's what you rely on which again is, I think, the same thing you want to do." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said, but the defense can't be asserted in the draft of the federal bill. MR. FORD said the contracts have to be relied on. CHAIRMAN KOTT laid aside Amendment 2. Number 1960 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG moved Amendment 3. It reads as follows: Page 1, lines 12-13 Delete "the following efforts to avoid the damages claimed in the civil action:" Insert "substantial efforts to avoid the damages claimed in the civil action, such as" Page 1, line 14: Delete "inventory" Insert "inventorying" Page 2, line 2: Delete "identify" Insert "identifying" Page 2, line 4: Delete "identify" Insert "identifying" Page 2, line 6: Delete "prepare" Insert "preparing" Page 2, line 9: Delete "comply with industry regulations or requirements" Insert "complying with generally accepted practices of a business sector" Page 2, line 12: Delete "develop" Insert "developing" CHAIRMAN KOTT objected. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said Amendment 3 removes the necessity to require every step in provision (A)-(F) before proving reasonable efforts. It also modifies the industry regulations and/or requirements. There is concern because there really aren't any industry standards in this field. CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Representative Rokeberg whether he said that there are no general accepted standards. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied, according to testimony from Scott Thorsson (ph), there may be some in the banking industries and certain other areas, but they are rare. Number 2211 CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Ford whether there is a substantial difference between "generally accepted practices" and "generally accepted standards." MR. FORD replied some areas do have written standards, but from what he's heard they are just practices in this area. Yes, there could be a difference between a practice and a standard. Number 2256 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated the bill sets up two different paths to know whether a business has done the right thing. One is a list and the other is an exercise of general care. There is the word "or" on page 2, line 13. He likes the dichotomy; they are proper options. To generalize both of them does away with some of that balance. Number 2394 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG appreciates Representative Croft's argument. He has been vacillating back and forth between those two things. The language is disjunctive. He suggested taking up Amendment 4 as well because it changes the general standard a little bit. That might help when talking about both of the approaches. TAPE 99-19, SIDE A Number 0001 CHAIRMAN KOTT noted it is unusual to talk about another amendment when there is a motion on the floor, but in light of the high confusion he ruled in favor of the request. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG explained Amendment 4. It reads as follows: Page 2, lines 14-6: Delete ", by following generally accepted standards of care and effort in the business activity in which the business was engaged, exercised due diligence and" Insert "used" REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated he has a letter that indicates Section 1 (a)(2) sets up three separate standards: an industry standard of care, a due diligence standard, and a reasonable care standard. There should only be one. It's nice to use the word "due diligence", but the reasonable care standard is the appropriate one. It provides for the general reasonable care efforts in order to assert the defense. It would be up to the courts to decide what is and isn't reasonable when asserting the defense. If Amendment 4 is adopted then Representative Croft's argument is even stronger. Number 0184 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated is makes sense to simplify or make Section 1(a)(2) more generic. He wouldn't object to adopting Amendment 4 and tabling Amendment 3. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked Mr. Ford whether his analysis is correct. MR. FORD replied he is concerned about getting closer to having standards that are different but substantially closer. "If you left the first amendment out and left (1) the same, then you have a specific laundry list which someone could follow and say, 'hey, I do what you told me to do, I can use the defense.' If they didn't follow that list and you adopted the second amendment which changes paragraph (2) then you still have that which is to say, 'but, I didn't follow your list but I used reasonable care.'" It is the best of both worlds. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he prefers that and thinks that is the way to go. Number 0278 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to amend Amendment 3 to retain the change to Page 2, line 9 and to delete everything else. There being no objection, it was so moved. It now reads as follows: Page 2, line 9: Delete "comply with industry regulations or requirements" Insert "complying with generally accepted practices of a business sector" REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG called the question on Amendment 3, as amended. Number 0435 REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA referred to Amendment 4 and asked how broad of a change is it. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied it is going from three different standards to one. REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked whether reasonable care encompasses the others. MR. FORD said he doesn't see a difference between due diligence and reasonable care. It says the same thing twice which is always confusing because the court would assume that it means something different. REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said she feels uncomfortable lessening the standard. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG agrees with Representative Kerttula. It also troubles him, but three different standards would allow the courts to confuse the issue even more. REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said she assumes that due diligence is within reasonable care. Number 0612 REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI asked whether there is any merit in defining some parameters within reasonable care. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied they are in Section 1(a)(1). He wants to leave Section 1(a)(2) in for a didactic kind of instructional thing. REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said (A) - (F) is limiting. What happens if there is a (G). REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied (G) is Section 1(a)(2). REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI replied the bill says reasonable care is (A) - (F). REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said a business could deviate from (A) - (F) and use Section 1(a)(2). That's the reason for having it. REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said, "I just don't want to get locked into those." Number 0642 CHAIRMAN KOTT asked why would there be a deviation. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied a small business doesn't always have a contingency plan. Number 0671 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said Section 1 (a)(1) is reasonable care, but it's not all that could be reasonable. "I mean, so, it is one avenue that we're gonna sanctify as enough, but I don't think the record should be that you always have to do that or there wouldn't be any need for (2). (1) is enough. Other things may be enough, other lesser...other things. But, it's in the 'or'. If other things were necessary, you could comply with (1) and still get away with..." Number 0722 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG wondered whether defining due diligence in Section 1(a)(2) as those things found in the list, but not necessarily those things or other things, would be tighter than reasonable standard. He's not sure whether that is the direction the committee wants to go. CHAIRMAN KOTT noted there is a motion on the floor to adopt Amendment 3, as amended. There being no objection, it was so moved. Number 0785 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG moved Amendment 4. There being no objection, it was so moved. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT withdrew Amendment 5. Number 0850 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT moved Amendment 6. It reads as follows: Page 3, lines 5 & 6 Delete "(1) damages may be awarded for economic losses only unless the business against whom the action is brought committed fraud;" REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG objected. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT explained Amendment 6 deletes the limitation on the categories of damage that can be recovered. A lot of this legislation is tied together with good definitions and holds together a logical relationship to Y2K acts, except for Section 1(d)(1). He doesn't see the reason for a general category of non-economic damages which has already been capped in tort reform laws. It seems like an arbitrary provision for something that has already been capped in a more general way. "Y2K may cause--this is the classic one that will get us trapped in unintended consequences. I don't know all the other consequences of this, in my onion, arbitrary provision. We have caps out there that'll apply to this. But, to say Y2K by its characteristic means no other--none of these other categories of loss. I don't see the relationship. And, I'd let the other caps that we already have in general tort reform law apply." Number 0984 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the federal bill takes a different approach. It provides for tort claims with limitations. It takes a broader look and categorizes contract law, tort law and class action. It sets a limit on all of those. He chose not to be as expansive. "I think that the idea here is that the limitation to economic loss is one that the whole circumstance of this situation whether it's a Y2K issue does not merit any advantages. Who are you trying to punish? Unless, you're trying to punish a noncompliant kind of guy that sat on his hands. Why are we just not suing for economic losses but--other than damages? That--that becomes, I think, the real issue here." The reason for the bill is to minimize vexatious type of litigation intended to merely enrich a litigator. The resources need to be put into solving the problem, not litigation. He doesn't want to create a tort claim because of an unusual fact-pattern, but he wants to limit the type of economic losses recovered. It's not his intention to entirely preclude a tort claim because there is probably some scenario were it would be worth it which is why he included the language "fraud". Number 1203 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said the reason the federal legislation gets through the different caps is because there is no general federal tort reform. "They don't have them if they don't put them in there. We already have them and we don't need them in here, I believe." There are unintended consequences with a blanket description. "If I'm the building manager and Otis Elevator Company sends me a note, we've got this Y2K, here's the embedded chip to replace it with, we're providing it for you for free, if you don't do this they will fall to the ground and kill people. And, they send me five letters with five chips to do this and I don't, you could get punitive damages there when--when somebody dies on the elevator, and you should. If--if--if--if the same situation happens with an embedded chip in a medical devise and I ignore it as a hospital, I mean, the problem is you can create situations where this--it's appropriate to have these. And, you said the whole point was to get rid of vexatious and frivolous litigation, I mean. This doesn't do anything about vexatious or frivolous litigation, in fact, it hits the meritorious claim, the odd, weird, possibly extremely meritorious claim. We have in other areas made these other general caps and--and they aren't in the federal law so if federal law wants 'em they have to put 'em in for a specific thing. We--we don't have to. We have that luxury that we've made that difficult public policy decision on how we should cap punitive and non-economics. And, to just take 'em out here, I don't see the point. It doesn't address frivolous litigation. It does greatly impact--eliminate certain weird, but possible cause of actions in very extreme cases and it's in an area where we've already declared a cap and the feds haven't." Number 1322 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said TITLE III of the federal bill says, "A party to a Y2K action making a tort claim may not recover damages for economic loss unless--...". There is a very good argument for a limitation, but this doesn't delete tort theory or wrongful deaths and egregious types of harm. He just doesn't want to open the door to unlimited, punitive damages. On the other hand, a case could be made for medical equipment and maybe there needs to be a distinction. Number 1384 REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA stated there could be willful misconduct, extreme recklessness, or death and there wouldn't be any economic loss. They shouldn't be foreclosed on. She agrees with Representative Croft. The restrictions are already there. Number 1419 CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Representative Croft to remove his motion in order for him to take action on putting the bill in a subcommittee. Number 1438 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT removed Amendment 6. CHAIRMAN KOTT assigned the bill to a subcommittee consisting of Representatives Murkowski, Rokeberg and Croft. He charged the subcommittee with looking at Amendments 2 and 6, and any other ancillary issues that arise.
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